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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the court which rendered a certain judgment had the requisite
authority and that the parties were legally brought before the court is
conclusive on the question and is not open to collateral attack.39 Mere
irregularities cannot be set up against the judgment when brought in
question in another state4 0 but it is well settled that the defense may be
interposed that the judgment was obtained by fraud.4 '
The principal case follows the weight of authority. The defendant
not having shown lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the procurement of
the judgment could not overturn it. Defendant was estopped to show
lack of jurisdiction by setting up its own violation of the statute requir-
ing it to designate the Insurance Commissioner as its attorney to accept
service.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Local Laws-Regulation of Professions-
Real Estate Brokers.
In 1868 the General Assembly of North Carolina was given consti-
tutional power to tax trades and professions.1 In 1899 the first license
tax was placed on real estate dealers. 2 A tax on this trade for the
purpose of raising revenue has continued to the present 3 and paying
this has been the only state-wide legal requirement for engaging in the
real estate business.
In 1927 an act 4 was passed which made the qualifications for
obtaining a license in eight counties depend upon the applicant's ability
to show to the satisfaction of a Real Estate Commission his reputation
for honesty and fair dealing and his competency to transact the business
in such a manner as to safeguard the public.5
This statute was held unconstitutional in State v. Warreno on the
ground that it was local in effect, applying to but eight counties, and
was thus discriminatory and in violation of the right to equal protection
of the laws. Had the act been applicable to the whole state, the majority
opinion implies that it would have been a valid use of the police power.
'Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628 (1893); Citizens' Nat.
Bank v. Consolidated Glass Co., 83 W. Va. 1, 97 S. E. 689 (1919).
'Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
" Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890);
Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 614, 49 L. ed. 998 (1904) ; Cannon v.
Howell, 131 N. C. 125, 42 S. E. 555 (1902); Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 448,
55 S. E. 371, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905 (1906) ; Mottu v. Daniels, 151 N. C. 237,
65 S. E. 969 (1909) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 68 S. E. 240 (1910); Ring
and Wellborn v. Whitman, 194 N. C. 544. 140 S. E. 159 (1927); Bonnett-Brown
Corp. v. Coble, 195 X. C. 491, 142 S. E. 772 (1928).
2N. C. CoNST. art. V, §3. 2 P. L. N. C. 1899, c. 2, §50.
3 P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 371, §100. 'Public-Local Laws 1927, c. 241.
The act likewise provided eleven causes for which the license might be sus-
pended or revoked.
0211 N. C. 75, 189 S. E. 108 (1937).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The effect of the decision is that the state can set character and pro-
fessional qualifications for all real estate brokers and salesmen, but
cannot regulate only a part as the sale of real estate is state-wide and
can be regulated only by general laws which affect every county.
It was not specifically stated which constitutional provisions were
violated by the act. It was condemned because it was not state-wide
and because it was discriminatory. The North Carolina Constitution
prohibits local legislation relating to trade;7 therefore, if the regulation
of real estate men so as to insure honesty and business capability can be
classed as a regulation of the real estate trade, then perhaps the legis-
lation was invalid under this constitutional provision. But the court did
not refer to the provision. If the court thought that the act in question
did contravene the prohibition, no doubt it would have been indicated.
Therefore, we turn to the second objection to the act.
The giving of exclusive emoluments or privileges is forbidden by
the North Carolina Constitution ;8 the taking of life, liberty or property
without due process are forbidden by both the North Carolina Consti-
tution9 and the Fourteenth Amendment; denial of equal protection of
the laws is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. These are doubt-
less the constitutional prohibitions which the court had in mind when it
said that the act was unconstitutional because discriminatory. An exami-
nation of the cases involving local laws wherein discrimination or lack
of due process was urged shows three classes of attempted regulations
under the police power. First, when the matters regulated were of such
a nature that local sentiment and circumstances were mainly responsible
for the enactment, the test for determining whether discrimination
existed has been whether the act equally affected all within the territory
defined in the act. 10 When the police power was invoked to require
Indian children to attend school longer than white, a warning was
sounded when two dissenting justices argued that this law was an
invalid departure from the constitutional requirement of uniformity
in all the essentials of the school system." Uniformity here meant
uniformity throughout the state. Second, in the field of criminal law,
the court said in condemning a local law making the killing of cattle
7 N. C. CoNsr. art II, §29.
8 N. C. CoNsT. art. I, §7. IN. C CoNsT. art. I, §17.
"'Local liquor laws held constitutional because locally uniform: State v. Muse,
20 N. C. 463 (1839) ; State v. Barringer, 110 N. C. 525, 14 S. E. 781 (1892) ;
State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506 (1905). Local laws regulating dogs
held constitutional: State v. Blake, 157 N. C. 608, 72 S. E. 1080 (1911) (citing
cases involving local laws on many subjects) ; Newell v. Green, 169 N. C. 462, 86
S. E. 291 (1915). Local law relating to the use of profanity on the property of a
certain mill in one county upheld: State v. Warren, 113 N. C. 683, 183 S. E. 498
(1893). The disposition of cotton in three counties regulated: State v. Moore,
104 N. C. 714, 10 S. E. 143 (1889).
"State v. Wolf, 145 N. C. 440, 59 S. E. 40 (1907).
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by a railroad in certain counties a misdemeanor that an act divested of
any peculiar circumstances and per se made indictable should be equally
and uniformly indictable throughout the state.'12 However, it was not
pointed out in this case, or in a majority of the others, what part of
the constitution was violated. Third, when under the guise of a police
regulation, agents in certain counties were required to pay a thousand
dollar license fee before hiring laborers to work outside the state, the
court held such fee to amount to a tax on a vocation and void for lack
of uniformity required of taxes on trades or professions.' 3 It was
pointed out that the legislature in exercising police power, as the term
police power is commonly interpreted, is not restrained by the consti-
tutional provision for uniformity. (Uniformity here presumably means
uniformity throughout the state.)
An examination of the legislation regulating other trades and
professions discloses that these laws have been all-inclusive in territorial
scope. Without doubt, this fact had great weight with the court in the
instant case.
14
" State v. Divine, 98 N. C. 778, 4 S. E. 477 (1887); State v. Fowler, 193
N. C 290, 136 S. E. 709 (1927) (A law applicable to five counties limiting the
punishment for the first offense of violating the prohibition law to a fine, hel a
grant of special exemption, an arbitrary class distinction.).
'State v. Moore, 113 N. C. 697, 18 S. E. 342 (1893) (N. C. CoNsr. art. V, §3
authorizes a tax on trades and professions, and although it is not expressly pro-
vided that such tax shall be uniform, yet a tax not uniform would be inconsistent
with other sections of the constitution. See Worth v. Wilmington and Weldon
R. R., 89 N. C. 291 (1883); Dalton v. Brown, 159 N. C. 175, 75 S. E. 40 (1912)
(An act levying a tax on lumber hauled 'by any lumber company using the public
roads of a certain county was held to be a legitimate police regulation for the
maintenance of the roads. A strong dissent urged that since the act did not apply
to private individuals or other heavy haulers, the tax was void for lack of uni-
formity.) ; State v. Bullock, 161 N. C. 223, 75 S. E. 942 (1912) (Where the tax
applied to all in the county 'who hauled 'heavy materials, it was unanimously held
non-discriminatory.). The following cases involve acts or ordinances enacted
under the police power, but do not exactly fit into the three categories set out in
the text. Plott Co. v. Ferguson Co., 202 N. C. 446, 163 S. E. 688 (1932)
(An act applicable to Buncombe County which sought to prescribe a
greater measure of liability upon a bond of indemnity than was imposed in the
other ninety-nine counties was held burdensome and discriminatory.); Edgerton
v. Hood, Comm'r of Banks, 205 N. C. 816, 172 S. E. 481 (1934) (An act provid-
ing that depositors in closed banks in certain counties might sell their claims to
debtors of the bank and that the bank should accept such claims at face value in
payment of debts was held to be a discrimination against debtors and creditors
of closed banks in other sections of the state.) ; State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644,
175 S. E. 142 (1934) (A municipal ordinance requiring operators of vehicles for
hire to deposit with the city treasurer policies of liability insurance or cash or
securities was held void as creating a monopoly and a turning of 'business over
to a privileged class since personal sureties were not allowed.).
1" State v. Van Doran, 109 N. C. 864, 14 S. E. 32 (1891) (doctors) ; State v.
Call, 121 N. C 643, 28 S. E. 517 (1897) (doctors); State v. Hicks, 143 N. C.
689, 57 S. E. 441 (1907) (dentists) ; State v. Siler, 169 N. C. 314, 84 S. E. 1015
(1915) (osteopaths) ; State v. Scott, 182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789 (1921) (ac-
countants); State v. Lockey, 198 N. C. 551, 152 S. E. 693 (1930) (barbers);
Roach v. Durham, 204 N. C. 587, 169 S. E. 149 (1933) (plumbers); N. C. CoDE
ANx. (Michie, 1935) §5259(1)-(29) (cosmetologists).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The 1937 General Assembly evidently believed that by following
existing interpretations of the constitutional prohibition against local
laws,15 that is, by the procedure of enacting a general law and excepting
the counties that did not wish to require by law a showing of honesty
and business capability from the real estate men, the odium of the
previous law, held unconstitutional in the principal case, could be
avoided. The 1937 Real Estate License Act,' 6 which embodies the
previous act almost word for word, is undoubtedly a general law, but
it is not necessarily a state-wide law since 48 counties are excepted
from its provisions.
17
The 1937 act may be valid so far as the constitutional prohibition
against local laws is concerned, granting that the prohibition is appli-
cable at all to real estate dealing as "trade". The act might have been
held not to violate this prohibition if it had originally been made to
apply to all the counties except ninety-two, instead of to eight counties.
It would not be a praiseworthy result, however, to hold that a law
applicable to counties A, B, and X is invalid, whereas a law applicable
to all counties excepting every county but A, B, and X is valid. Legal
formalism is justly condemned when the form serves no purpose.
But even though the legislature has framed the new act to avoid
possible violation of the prohibition against local legislation, the objec-
tion that the act is discriminatory is as forceful as ever. If the court
adheres to its position that such regulation of the real estate business
is a matter of state-wide, not local, concern, it is hard to see how the
new act can escape the fate of the old, since real estate men in
forty-eight counties do not have to meet the requirements of the act.
18
WILLIAM THORNTON WHITSETT.
' In 1917 the North Carolina Constitution was amended, N. C. CoNsT. art. II,
§29 prohibiting local laws in fourteen enumerated fields. Under this provision
in distinguishing between general laws and local acts the court has gone so far
as to hold that though the constitution prevented local legislation relating to
bridges and ferries, an act which created in one county a commission for the build-
ing of bridges was valid. Huneycutt v. Comm'rs of Stanly County, 182 N. C.
319, 109 S. E. 4 (1921). It held that an act to be condemned as local must direct
the construction of a particular bridge at a specific spot. Day v. Comm'rs of
Yadkin and Surry counties, 191 N. C. 780, 113 S. E. 164 (1926). Likewise, the
court held that a law was no less general because a number of counties were ex-
cepted from the act. In re Harriss, 183 N. C. 633, 112 S. E. 425 (1922) (though
forty-four counties were excepted from the law establishing courts inferior to
the Superior court, this was held to be a general law and as such valid despite
the prohibition against local legislation in this field.). Spruill, The Proposed Con-
stitution and Special, Private, and Local Legislation in North Carolina (1933)
11 N. C. L. REv. 140.
P1 .L. N. C. 1937, c. 292, §§1-17%. P7 . L. N. C. 1937, c. 292, §173/2.
"In spite of the dicta -by the North Carolina court in the principal case to the
effect that a state-wide law regulating those engaged in the real estate business
would be upheld, there are grounds for arguing that legislative control in this
occupation is too wide an extension of the police power. The court quotes with
approval from Rawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 292, 279 S. W. 350, 352 (1925)
which held a state-wide regulation of the real estate trade unconstitutional. "'If
